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1.  India’s water challenges: the hybrid model   
 
Every country has to mind its water business. But for a country like India, where it rains 
for roughly 100 hours of the year, the management of water becomes even more critical. 
It literally determines if the country remains poor or becomes rich; diseased or healthy. 
In other words, water is the determinant of its future.  
 
It is evident from media reports that the scarcity of water is imprinted across India. From 
the villages of high-rainfall states of Kerala to Meghalaya to the water-stressed regions 
of central India to cities everywhere, the want of water is a crying need. The reports 
suggest that the scarcity of water is crippling most of India. Millions do not have enough 
water, particularly during summer months, and women and girls have to walk long 
distances to fetch water. In the search for water, people are going deeper into the 
ground, lowering the groundwater table and leaving wells dry. The per capita availability 
of water for India in 2001 is expected to be half its 1947 level. Poor sanitation and 
unsafe drinking water account for a substantial part of the disease burden in India, 
contributing to diarrhoea, dysentery, typhoid, worms, jaundice and cholera. Each drought 
destroys the abilities of rural communities to cope. It makes them weaker and more 
disabled to deal with the vagaries of the monsoon. And in that way drought becomes 
permanent and long lasting and eats away at the very insides of the country. This is why 
people across the country want their politicians to deliver on this one promise: water to 
drink and to irrigate their crops.  
 
The issue of water is not about scarcity but about its careful use and about its equitable 
and distributed access. Water is the starting point for the removal of poverty in the 
country. It becomes the basis of food and livelihood security. But what is clear is that 
water management strategies will need to be carefully designed so that they lead to 
distributed wealth generation. This will require reworking the paradigm of water 
management, so that it is designed to harvest, augment and use local water resources 
so that it leads to local and distributed wealth generation. It is also clear that local and 
distributed water infrastructure, will require new forms of institutional management as 
water bureaucracies will find it difficult to management such vast and disparate systems. 
It is here that countries like India must learn from their traditional community based water 
management systems, so that they can build ways to the future.  
 
The current irrigation systems of India are dominated by individually owned and 
operated wells and tubewells. Groundwater is the main source of irrigation to agriculture, 
even as the country has invested in creating surface water systems. The problem is that 
surface water systems, built at considerable capital costs, are plagued by huge 
distribution losses and inefficiencies, as compared to the informal world of the 
groundwater agriculturists who have learnt to maximise the value of their water 
investment in making crops grow. But in the formal water vision, there is no place for the 
informal world of groundwater users. No policy can even account for them. No policy 
plans for them, for nobody understands how to manage this army of water users.  
 The point is to innovate, by borrowing from the past. The challenge is to enlist this army 
of informal water users into managing their resource better. It is imperative that 
groundwater is recharged so that the rate of abstraction is not greater than the rate of 
the water infiltration. The traditional water systems were designed to ensure that 
rainwater was stored in millions of disaggregated and diverse structures, which would in 
turn lead to local recharge of water into the ground. It is this distributed water harvesting 
that will build water security.  
 
The great water leapfrog 
The problem becomes more intractable as the country progresses: moves from using 
water in traditional sectors like agriculture to industries and urban areas.  It is for this 
reason that a country like India is considered a traditional water economy and that it has 
to make the transition to a modern water economy. In other words, the water sector has 
to become part of the formalised economy, with formal institutions and mechanisms for 
its management and pricing.   
 
The point to understand is what this modern and formal water economy means in the 
rest of the world and what it will mean for countries like India. In the industrialised world, 
industry and urban households use over 70 per cent of the water resources, while 
agriculture gets the remaining 30 per cent. In traditional water economies like India, the 
reverse is true: agriculture consumes over 70 per cent and industry and urban areas the 
rest. The point is not where we are. The point is: where are we heading?  
 
The fact is that urban areas and industrial centres in countries like India are now putting 
greater pressure on water resources. Cities across the country need more water for their 
growing population and more importantly, their growing affluence. Their growing demand 
leads to pressure to source water from further and further away. The capital city of Delhi 
will get water from the Tehri dam, over 300 km away in the Himalaya; The software 
capitals of the country, Hyderabad, from Nagarjunasagar dam on the Krishna river 105 
km away; and Bangalore, from the Cauvery, about 100 km away. The desert city of 
Udaipur used to draw its water from the magnificent Jaisamand lake but it is drying up 
and so the city is desperately seeking a way out of this new thirst.  
 
The problem is that the ‘informal’ water economy of rural India, its agriculture dependent 
population still exists. The economy has not transformed from being agriculture-
dependent to a manufacture-service sector driven one. The water crisis is about the 
management of these competing needs – the vast rural economies, which need water 
for their food and livelihood security and the newer growth economies of modern and 
industrial India. This water competition is leading to low intensity conflicts between 
different users. For instance, when the southern city of Chennai wanted to source its 
drinking water from the Veeranam lake some distance from the city, farmers agitated 
against the withdrawal for the thirsty city. When the Gujarati city of Rajkot needed  water, 
farmers drew fire and were killed. In 2005, in two separate incidents in Rajasthan 
farmers were killed as they rioted against water withdrawal from their neighbouring 
reservoir or canal for distant cities. 
 
It is because of this imperative that water policy has to shun the dogma that dictates 
against pricing of water and its efficient management. Cities and the industries of rich 
India must begin to pay for the water they use. But pricing and markets will not suffice. It 
is also equally imperative that water management paradigms and their technologies are 
reinvented for this poor-rich world.  
 
On the one hand these rich cities of the poor world will have to invest in efficiency so that 
they do not first become water wasteful and then learn the science and art of efficiency. On the other hand, they will also have to invest in managing and treating their waste 
water. Today, cities extract from cleaner upstream sources and discharge their waste – 
sewage and industrial effluents downstream – which in turn leads to increased problem 
of polluted water and ill-health for poorer users of the rivers. The capital intensity of the 
modern sewage system – its transportation and eventual treatment before disposal – is 
such that it cannot be afforded by all users, and even all urban areas. The question then 
is how will the modern cities of India grow, without creating water waste and pollution? 
How will these cities innovate so that they can practice the technologies of recycling and 
reuse, even before their counterparts in the industrial world? The challenge is to re-
invent the most modern waste management system that reuses every drop of water 
discharged, at costs that can be afforded by all.   
 
There is no denying India’s water sector needs to be reformed, indeed transformed, so 
that it can provide clean and adequate water to all. But what has to be accepted is that 
there is no established model for this transformation. A country like India has to leapfrog 
over the modern economic paradigm, to create its own — hybrid — version of the water 
future. Modern water policy will have to be built on the premise that scarcity is not about 
the lack of resources but about being wise about the use of resources.  
 
This paper discusses elements of this alternative water paradigm.  
 
2. Learning the traditions of water  
 
The current water crisis in India is not about scarcity per se. It is about the management 
of water resources so that the infrastructure is capable of reaching out to poor people 
living in poor regions of the country. It is here that the country needs to learn from the 
technologically diverse systems of rainwater harvesting that were practiced across the 
ecologically diverse country some many years ago. A careful understanding of these 
systems makes it evident that water management is not about technology, but about the 
manner of control and governance of the resource. These diverse system used to 
harvest rainwater across the different regions of the country were community-based 
systems, not state or private systems. It becomes clear that water then is not about 
technology but about deepening democracy so that communities can be involved in the 
governance of the resource. In the mid-1990s, the Delhi based Centre for Science and 
Environment published its report on traditional water harvesting systems, Dying 
Wisdom,
1 which has helped the country learn, not just about the treasures that existed in 
the past, but about the wisdom of water management which need to become the way of 
the future.  
 
Potential of rainwater harvesting 
There have been two major discontinuities in water management since the 19th century. 
One, the State has emerged as the major provider of water replacing communities and 
households as the primary units for provision and management of water. Two, there has 
been growing reliance on the use of surface and groundwater, while the earlier reliance 
on rainwater and floodwater has declined, even though rainwater and floodwater are 
available in much greater abundance than river water or groundwater.  
 
Theoretically, the potential of water harvesting in meeting household needs is enormous. 
Rain captured from 1-2 per cent of India’s land can provide India’s population of 1 billion 
as much as 100 litres of water per person per day. The calculations show that there is no 
village in India which cannot meet its drinking water needs through rainwater harvesting.  
 Even in an arid area with an annual rainfall level of only 100 mm, one hectare of land will 
harvest as much as one million litres of water. As there is a synergy between population 
density and rainfall levels, less land is required is required in more densely populated 
areas to capture the same amount of rainwater. And in such areas, there is usually more 
built-up area like roof-tops which have improved runoff efficiency.         
 
Rainwater harvesting not only provides a source of water to increase water supplies but 
also involves people in water management, making water everybody’s business. 
Because it builds people’s relationship with their water and maximises the use of local 
water resources it also reduces the operational and distribution costs and most 
importantly enables people to internalise the full costs of their water requirements, thus 
encouraging conserving in water demand. Most importantly, water harvesting can not 
only meet people’s basic water needs but is part of the strategy to improve the local food 
and livelihood security of the rural poor. 
 
Water harvesting and integrated land-water management is not new to India or to many 
other parts of the developing world. The art and science of ‘collecting water where it falls’ 
is ancient but this ‘dying wisdom’ needs to be revived to meet modern freshwater needs 
and modernised with inputs from science and technology. 
 
Water harvesting can be undertaken through a variety of ways: 
 
a) Capturing runoff from rooftops 
b) Capturing runoff from local catchments 
c) Capturing seasonal floodwaters from local streams 
d) Conserving water through watershed management 
 
A history of harvesting: More than two millennia old 
 
The nature of the country’s diverse ecology forced Indians to develop the art of water 
harvesting. Though the country has a high average annual rainfall — as much as 1,100 mm 
— this rainfall is not evenly spread across the year. In most parts of the country, there is 
precipitation for not more than 50 days. On the days when rainfall does occur, it does not fall 
over a period of 24 hours. In fact, heavy showers are common. Most of the country receives 
rain for just about 100 hours each year. 
 
Not surprisingly, any water gifted by the heavens or flowing past in a stream has been 
harvested in India since antiquity. Archaeologist B M Pande explains that evidence of 




Dholavira, a major site of the Indus Valley civilisation, dating back to the third millennium 
BC was diiscovered in the 1960s. The ancient settlement lies in an arid area that gets an 
average annual rainfall of 260 mm. There are no perennial sources of water in the form 
of lakes or rivers. Subterranean water is, by and large, brackish and saline. The 
inhabitants of Dholavira, therefore, created several reservoirs to collect the monsoon 
runoff flowing down the flanking streams of the Manhar and Mansar. Stone bunds were 
raised across them at suitable points to divert the flow of water into a series of reservoirs 
that were dug out in the sloping areas between the inner and outer walls of the 
Harappan city. Likewise, a network of drains crisscrossing the citadel was also laid out to 
collect rainwater. Rainwater harvesting was the way of life.  
 India has an extraordinary diversity of agro-ecological systems, ranging from the hot 
desert of Rajasthan to the cold desert of trans-Himalayan Ladakh, from the sub-
temperate Himalayan mountains to the high tropical mountains in the south; interspersed 
are various hill and mountain ranges, plateaus and the unique Indo-Gangetic plains 
which are more flood-prone than any other part in the world. Each region had its own 
specific way of harvesting water (see Annexure 1: Traditional Wisdom).  
Decline of the systems: the role of the state 
It is important to note that ancient Indian rulers rarely built water harvesting structures 
themselves. They instead created fiscal systems to encourage communities to build and 
manage water systems. This changed with the coming of the British rule into India.  
 
These Indian rulers preceding the British did not boast of irrigation bureaucracies or 
public works departments to create these structures. Referring to Rajasthan’s Thar 
desert, traditional knowledge expert Komal Kothari says, “While collecting information 
from some 600 villages, I found that the state, the jagirdar (landowner) or anybody who 
had anything to do with revenue collection did not create any water body for the people. 
All water bodies constructed by the erstwhile kings, jagirdars (local chiefs) were reserved 
for their personal use. The people largely had to fend for themselves.”
3 Though the role 
of the state varied from one region to another, what historical records show is that rulers 
rarely built irrigation structures themselves. The massive Pichola lake in the city of 
Udaipur, for instance, was built by nomadic gypsies. However, the rulers did play an 
important role in encouraging people to build water harvesting structures. 
 
The famous Vijayanagar kings of south India (1336-1564 AD), for instance, placed great 
importance on developing irrigation facilities for agricultural improvement. But they used 
fiscal policies to encourage the development of people built and managed infrastructure. 
Land tax, which was collected in kind in the form of one-sixth of the produce, was an 
important source of revenue for Indian rulers. The rulers’ fortunes depended on agriculture. 
The state, therefore, had a vested interest in encouraging private initiative to develop 
irrigation systems. The Vijayanagar kings would make dasavanda or kattu kodage grants to 
individuals or institutions which undertook such works. The enterprising person would be 
granted a piece of tax-free land watered by the tank, canal or well which he or she excavated. 
The extent of the grant varied with the importance of the work. Great religious merit was 
also attached to the maintenance and repair of irrigation works by the Vijayanagar kings. 
An inscription dating to 1413 states: “A ruined family, a breached tank or pond, a fallen 
kingdom, whomsoever restores, or repairs a damaged temple, acquires merit four-fold of 
that which accrued from them at first.” 
 
Early British observers were full of praise for the Vijayanagar irrigation works they saw. 
Colonel Thomas Munro (the governor of Madras in 1820), noting the irrigation system in 
the area around Vijayanagar, said: “To attempt the construction of new tanks is perhaps 
a more hopeless experiment than the repair of those which have been filled up (through 
siltation), for there is scarcely any place where a tank can be made to advantage that 
has not been applied to this purpose by the inhabitants.”
4
British rule: changing ways of doing things 
British rule, unfortunately, laid this enormous heritage to waste. In their desire to rule, 
administer and maximise their revenues from this rich land, the British steadily changed 
the land and water tenure systems, which gradually but systematically lead to the 
destruction of community based resource management systems.  
 Early British observers like Charles Metcalfe and Henry Maine had described India as a 
land of ‘village republics’. What this meant, says historian Dharampal, is “that the 
‘village’, to an extent, had all the semblance of the State; it controlled revenue and 
exercised authority within its sphere... The basic element of this ‘village republic’ was the 
authority it wielded, the resources it controlled and dispensed, and the manner of such 
resource utilisation... Indian society and polity had basically been organised according to 
non-centralist concepts... That the annual exchequer receipts of Mughal emperor 
Jahangir did not amount to more than five per cent of the computed revenue of his 
empire, and that of (later Emperor) Aurangzeb with all his zeal for maximising such 
receipts, did not ever exceed 20 per cent, is symptomatic of the concepts and 
arrangements which governed Indian polity.... there is voluminous data scattered in the 
British records themselves which confirm the view, that in terms of the basic expenses, 
both education and medical care, the expenses of the local police, and the maintenance 
of irrigation facilities, had primary claims on revenue...”
5
 
By about 1800, a very large percentage of these revenue assignments had been 
altogether dispossessed, reducing their beneficiaries to penury. Most of the remaining 
had their assignments greatly reduced so that they could no longer perform the 
educational, water management or other functions that they were expected to undertake. 
It was the task of Thomas Munro to reduce revenue-free assignments in the ceded 
districts to a mere five per cent of the total cultivated land. The revenue thus collected 
was drained out of the land and the country, leaving behind a devastated natural 
resource management system. With the destruction of the indigenous financial system, 
community property slowly became nobody’s property. 
 
Furthermore, what the colonial rulers could not own or earn money from, they neglected. 
As Arthur Cotton, the pioneer of modern irrigation in India, himself noted in 1874 about 
local water harvesting systems: “There are a multitude of old native works in various 
parts of India... These are noble works, and show both boldness and engineering talent. 
They have stood for hundreds of years. When I first arrived in India, the contempt with 
which the natives justly spoke of us on account of this neglect of material improvements 
was very striking; they used to say we were a kind of civilised savages, wonderfully 
expert about fighting but so inferior to their great men that we would not even keep in 
repair the works they had constructed, much less even imitate them in extending the 
system.”
6
A bureaucracy is borne  
The British tried to take remedial measures when they realised their mistake, but they 
failed to comprehend the strength of the indigenous system completely. As a result, the 
measures they undertook also failed. Firstly, they created irrigation and public works 
bureaucracies which were supposed to own and manage the neglected water harvesting 
systems. When these technocracies failed to revive these systems, the British 
authorities in Madras presidency, in the mistaken belief that local communities would 
undertake voluntary labour to maintain the tanks as a tradition, enacted the notorious 
Madras Compulsory Labour Act of 1858. With the progress of British rule, there was also 
a gradual shift in emphasis from minor irrigation works like tanks, wells, bandharas 
(dams) and small river channels to large dams and canals commanding extensive areas. 
Indian rulers, on the other hand, continued to build and maintain tanks in states which 
had remained free from British rule.  
Independent India: perpetuating the same  
Even worse, the British educated an entire class of Indians which no longer appreciated 
or understood this inherent strength of people’s wisdom. The leaders of modern India also turned their backs on these systems. Indians invested almost exclusively in mega-
irrigation projects and depended on the same bureaucracy to manage its water systems. 
Over time, other changes have taken place in several parts of India which have further 
eroded the traditional water harvesting systems. Overall, there has been a downfall in 
community self-management as bureaucratic intervention in village affairs has been 
steadily encouraged by India’s political leaders. Technological changes like the 
introduction of tubewells has meant that richer farmers in the command area of a tank, 
who can install these tubewells, no longer have an interest in cooperating with the rest of 
the community in managing the tanks. Many central and southern Indian cities like 
Hyderabad, Chennai (Madras) and Bangalore grew up around traditional water harvesting 
systems. But in these urban areas too, these systems have either disappeared because of 
pressure from real estate lobbies or have become heavily polluted. Today, traditional water 
harvesting systems continue to play an important role largely in remote areas where the 
reach of water bureaucracies remains weak, as in many Himalayan states. 
 
3.  Modern India’s tryst with irrigation 
 
Since the past 55 odd years of its Independent history, the country has invested 
substantial in building infrastructure for irrigation. This has, undoubtedly increased the 
area under food crops as well as yields. The production of food grains increased from 51 
million tonnes in 1950 to over 200 million by the end of the 1990s – over half of this 
increase is attributed directly to investment in irrigation facilities.
7   
 
But even with this investment, the country remains predominantly rainfed – with vast 
areas of the country dependent on its seasonal and variable rainfall for growing food. By 
2005 out of the gross sown area of 192 million ha, only 43 per cent is irrigated.
8 Water 
for agriculture remains the most critical and perhaps the most limiting factor on its 
growth. Equally the lack of irrigation facilities has regional variations in the country, with 
the poorest regions – with extreme poverty and destitution – remaining without water 
security.    
 
The country’s current five year plan – the national programme – aims to complete the 
many major and medium irrigation projects, which are in the pipeline. It estimates that 
169 major and 219 medium irrigation projects have spilled over from the earlier planning 
periods, with a liability of Rs 92,000 crore as of April 1, 2004.
9 As much as 13 million ha 
of additional potential is locked in these projects.  
 
But planners accept that this infrastructure programme has problems.  
 
One, it is confounded by both increased cost of irrigation infrastructure and declining 
investment from the state in this sector. The mid-term appraisal of the 10
th Plan has 
estimated that the capital costs of creating additional hectare of irrigation can range from 
Rs 40,000 ha to Rs 2,50,000 ha, where storage facilities are required – which is over a 
doubling from the previous decade. The states have borrowed to create the 
infrastructure and are finding it difficult to repay the interest, let alone the principal. By 
2004-05, Maharashtra, which has worked hard to develop its water resources, has an 
interest burden, which adds up to over 15 per cent of its tax revenue.
10 The market has 
also shown little interest in irrigation bonds, with the risk of repayment high from the 
thousands of users of the water. 
 
Two, it has not been able to provide water across the country. Even after years of 
investment in irrigation facilities, over 45 per cent of the food grain production is grown 
on lands, which are rainfed. These are also the lands, where poverty is extreme. In other words, investment in surface irrigation systems has created islands of prosperity but has 
done little to improve local food security.  
  
Furthermore, as the cost of infrastructure has increased, it has not been possible to 
recover the cost of the capital investment and operation and maintenance of the system 
from individual farmers. In most states of the country, agencies recover less than 30 per 
cent of the costs of maintenance of the system. This has lead to deterioration in 
systems, with an estimated 20-25 million ha of surface water irrigated canals in need of 
desperate repair.
11 The problem is compounded by the fact that water charges are 
based on the area of land and type of crop and not on the volume of water used. This 
does not obviously lead to careful and prudent decisions on its use, which then leads to 
problems of inefficient use and resultant scarcity.  
 
This water economy is directly linked to the agricultural and livelihood economy of 
farmers in the country. It is also important to note that the decreasing prices of cereal 
grains in the world has contributed to making the irrigation infrastructure in the 
developing world even more difficult to sustain. Farmers of the South find it difficult to 
compete with the subsidies for grain production in the industrialised world and this 
makes them devalue their natural capital – water for irrigation.  
 
It is no surprise that facilities created, at tremendous cost, often remain underutilised 
because of poor maintenance and other operational problems. This gap between the 
potential of irrigation created and what is utilised is currently assessed to be 14 million 
ha – as much as 20 per cent of the irrigation potential of the country.  
 
In addition, large surface irrigation systems, which require water transportation over long 
distances, have substantial losses and inefficiencies. The report of the expert group set 
up to prepare an integrated water development plan for the country, says in its view 
surface irrigation systems operate with as little as 35-40 per cent efficiency, while 
groundwater irrigation systems work at 65-70 per cent.  
 
Three, large irrigation projects require large storage – reservoirs – of water created, 
which in a densely populated country like India, leads to problems of displacement of 
villages and submergence of forests and biodiversity rich areas. It is for this reason, that 
the protest over the building of dams has been the most contentious environmental 
issues of the country. All in all, the government is finding that the strategy for creating 
large scale irrigation infrastructure, however urgent is limited and difficult to conceive.  
 
Groundwater: used and abused  
But it is fallacy of believe that investment in surface irrigation systems provides the 
country with its water for growing crops. The investment in large reservoir based 
irrigation systems – which store and then transport water in canals, has undoubtedly 
being the country’s main water obsession. The British Colonial rulers created irrigation 
and public works bureaucracies to own and manage the till then community run water 
management systems. This trend continued with modern India. But even as the state 
took control of water from communities, private individuals regained their control over the 
resource as groundwater irrigation became the mainstay of farmers in the country.  
 
It is variously estimated that as much as three-fourth of the irrigated area in the country 
is under groundwater. The irrigation infrastructure has been created by individual 
farmers – both rich and poor – using funds available from money lenders or the meagre 
institutional finance through state credit agencies. It can be well argued that this lack of 
institutional support for infrastructure and the dependence on private finance is one key 
cause of farmer indebtedness and poverty in large parts of the country. Groundwater structures have increased from 4 million in 1951 to 17 million in 1997. The irrigation 




But even this may be an underestimate. The recently concluded 3
rd minor irrigation 
census – which estimates the area irrigated by sources other than large surface 
irrigation projects – finds that as much as 62.4 million ha -- 75 to 80 per cent of the 
irrigation potential is under groundwater.
13 It estimates that there are roughly 19 million 
wells – dugwells, shallow and deep tubewells – in the country. In other words, there are 
roughly as many as 19 million decision makers, who constitute the irrigation 
entrepreneurs of the country. Groundwater provides the bulk of irrigation infrastructure in 
the country.  
 
It is also estimated that roughly 80-90 per cent of drinking water is from groundwater 
sources. The management of this resource will then determine the sustainability of water 
use in the country. Groundwater is the lifeline that will make India shine or sink.  
 
But it is also the water lifeline that policy is least mindful of, partly because of the 
inherent problems of regulating its use. The frenetic pace of development of this 
resource has meant that groundwater levels across the country are declining sharply. 
The water level in 306 districts has fallen by over 4 metres during the past 20 years, with 
many blocks in these districts categorised as over exploited or in critical stages of 
resource development.
14 Technology is allowing for deeper and deeper penetration and 
extraction. The electricity subsidy — cheap and unreliable energy for pumping — 
worsens the situation, with estimations that farmers end up using almost double the 
water for each unit of crop when they have access to cheap or free power as compared 
to pump-sets using paid diesel.   
 
The problem of groundwater is both legal and technological. Under the irrigation laws, 
namely the Indian Easement Act of 1882, groundwater is considered an easement 
connected to land. In other words, groundwater belongs to the landowner, who is free to 
extract and use it. The act was promulgated when groundwater use was limited both by 
need and by technology for well digging and water pumping. With the advent of electric 
powered pumps, it is possible to go deeper extract water, which leads to problems of 
over-extraction. The 2005 minor irrigation census found that over 50 per cent of the 
groundwater structures were electric powered. 
 
In the recent years the Ministry of Water Resources has prepared and circulated a model bill 
to regulate and control groundwater use. But given the political sensitivities of this regulation, 
only five states – Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Tamil Nadu, Lakshwadeep and Kerala – have 
enacted some form of legislation. But what legislation does not recognise is that regulating 19 
million users through systems of licensing and bureaucratic fiat will clearly be an impossible 
task. Instead regulation will demand tremendous innovation and management ingenuity to 
involve local communities in controlling use and public agencies to provide information about 
the state of the resource and its availability to managers. The fact is that groundwater is a 
replenishable asset and what is needed is a comprehensive approach to recharge wells, 
so that annual abstraction is limited to what is sustainable.    
 
Recharge: role of water harvesting 
But even as groundwater has overtaken the surface water systems in terms of the 
acreage irrigated, what is to particular concern is that minor irrigation systems – tanks, 
ponds and all other community-based and decentralised water harvesting systems have 
simultaneously declined in importance. These systems played a critical role in the recharge of groundwater as they stored the monsoon rainwater, which then recharged 
underground aquifers.  
 
According to official estimates, poor maintenance, siltation and in particular the complete 
disregard for the protection of the catchment areas of the tanks had meant that the area 
irrigated by tanks has declined from 3.6 million ha in the 1950s to as little as 2.5 million 
ha by 2000. During this same period, the area irrigated by wells – groundwater – surged 
from as little as 6 million ha to 36 million ha and more, out of a total irrigated area of 53 
million ha.  
 
This has clearly meant that not only has the ability of rural people to benefit from 
decentralised water structures declined, but it has seriously compromised the 
sustainability of groundwater irrigation as well (see graph 1). In the last decade, this loss 
of water bodies has continued. While the 2
nd Minor Irrigation Census, conducted in the 
mid-1980s, counted 750,000 tanks and other surface water bodies, the next census 
enumerated only 556,000 such structures.  
 
These diverse community structures were the key to irrigation in the pre-British years. 
During the Colonial rule, state policy deliberated negated the importance of these 
structures (see section: Learning the traditions of water). But even so, when India 
became Independent, irrigation statistics reveal that in the southern states of the 
country, tanks and other community managed water systems irrigated as much area as 
did wells. But by the late 1990s, while the area under tanks continued to decline, area 
under groundwater increased manifold. This then meant that there was even less 




Graph 1: The disconnect between tanks and wells: losing the sponges of India 
36169.00






















































Wells (including tube wells)
 Source: 2000-2001 data: Statistical abstract India 2003, 
http://agricoop.nic.in/statistics/st3.htm as viewed on August 16, 2005.  
 
 
4. Drinking water programmes: zero sum game 
 The provision of drinking water is a key target of the Millennium Development Goals. 
India, which still remains a laggard in meeting the goal, has not been wanting in its 
programme to provide drinking water. What is important to understand is why the 
programme continues to flounder and what needs to be done to provide something as 
basic as water to drink to all.  
 
As early as the 1970s, the Indian government introduced the accelerated rural water 
supply programme to build handpumps or provide piped water schemes in the scattered 
hamlets and villages across the country. In 1986, the programme was revamped as the 
Technology Mission on Drinking Water and in 1999, the government proclaimed it would 
provide safe drinking water to all in five years and upgraded the mission. A new 
department of drinking water supply was created.    
 
By 2002-03, the country had spent Rs 40,000 crore in creating drinking water 
infrastructure and over 91.6 per cent of villages were ‘fully’ covered – that is, they had a 
source of water 1.6 km from the settlement. But even government officially accepts that 
this estimation is not worth even the paper it is written on. Villages are “covered”, but 
water is not available.  
 
This is clear from the periodic surveys conducted by government to assess the shortage 
of drinking water in rural areas. The survey shows that even though a large number of 
villages are covered between the two surveys, the number of problem villages keeps 
growing. That is, even as government reaches 100,000 settlements each year through 
pipes and handpump, it finds another 100,000 — source dried-up, or water quality fallen 
or pipe broken — back in the list. The government assessment says, “A large number of 
habitations have slipped from being fully covered to partially covered status and from 
partially covered to not covered status. In addition, there are 217,000 habitations which 
are affected by water quality problems, from arsenic, fluoride or salinity.”
15  The drinking 
water mathematics then means that 100,000 problem villages minus 100,000 problem 
villages is still 100,000 problem villages.  
 
This problem of sustainability was recognised by government agencies and in early 2000 
the drinking water programme was reformed.  It allocated 20 per cent of the rural water 
supply funds to quality improvement and keeping the source sustainable, and 15 per 
cent for operation and maintenance (O&M). But the funds remain grossly insufficient. The 
Kerala based research institution, Centre for Development Studies has estimated that 
the entire annual expenditure on the programme some Rs 2,000 crore each year is 
needed just to meet the replacement costs of equipment and for its O&M.  
 
The government also realised the need to provide greater community ownership over 
the programme. In late 2002 the programme was further revamped so that the 
“community would own, operate and maintain” the water system. Under this scheme, 
communities are required to contribute 10 per cent to the total capital costs; once 
completed, panchayats (elected local government) take over the operation and 
maintenance of the scheme. They charge for water delivery and recover costs for 
maintaining the scheme. The state by downloading its public function believes that it will 
solve the “sustainability and quality” problem plaguing the programme.  
 
But even with this reform, the programme falters. The simple fact is that the country has 
not learnt how it will build and maintain decentralised water systems, which in turn 
require decentralised governance. It is equally clear that technology choices and 
approaches for water management need change. Currently drinking water programmes 
fail because they plan for the pipe and not the water source. It is here that India must learn from its traditions, how people learnt to live both with the scarcity as well as the 
excesses of water.  
 
5. The paradigm shift: community-based experiences     
 
This water history documents that people across India, had found diverse solutions in 
diverse ecological regions to manage their water needs. People had learnt to live, with 
the excesses of water, and with its scarcity. They all worked on the principle of rainwater 
harvesting in a country, which gets rain for only 100 hours of the 8760 hours in a year. 
They knew that all the rain of the year could come in just one cloudburst. The solution 
was to capture that rain and to use it to recharge groundwater reserves for the remaining 
year. The answer ultimately was to use the land for storing and channelising the rain — 
over the ground, or under. Catching water where it falls and when it falls.  
 
But it was equally clear policies to optimise the water endowment of each region and 
need practices to organise water management at each settlement, to harvest the most 
and to use in the least wasteful way. Then this can only be done if local communities are 
involved in managing their water systems. The water agenda, therefore, needed building 
local interests and institutions so that its governance is put into the hands of people. 
 
The issue then is what the country can learn from the traditional practices of water 
management in its modern water policy. Over the past many years, many villages 
scattered across India have practiced the model of community-based water 
management. These experiences are testimony to the potential of generating economic 
wealth from rainwater harvesting. What is also remarkable is the short time it takes to 
transform a poverty stricken, destitute and ecologically-devastated village to a relatively 
rich and green village.
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It is important to learn from the micro-experiences to understand the policies needed for 
the ‘scaling up’ the experiments so that the country can work with using water as the 
starting point for poverty removal.  
 
The case studies given below show clearly that ecorestoration is possible even in highly 
degraded lands and that this can regenerate the local rural economy. The key to this 
ecological regeneration lies in good management and use of the local rainwater 
endowment but the entire exercise must be underpinned by community-based decision-
making systems and institutions, and enabling legal and financial measures which 
promote community action.  
 
It is important to note that the nature of the institution is critical for the management of 
natural resources. Village resource management needs the cooperation of people living 
in the settlement – the rich and the poor, the landed and the landless. The settlement-
level institution must work with a high order of democracy and transparency in decision-
making in order to engender cooperation and discipline within the group members. In 
India, village-level institutions have worked best when they are built on the Gandhian 
concept of a gram sabha, which is built on the concept of participatory democracy and 
not representative democracy. This is because open public forums, being more 
transparent by nature, work much better than small, elected village councils to bring 
about good natural resource management and sort out intra-community differences. 
Even in areas where inequality is intense, there will be greater chances of obtaining 
community decisions that are equitous in open village forums than in forums, which are 
closed and secretive. Resolution of intra-village conflicts and coordination are invariably easier in open village meetings because they introduce transparency, accountability and 
confidence in community decision-making. Decisions taken in a non-transparent manner 
by a small coterie of village leaders rarely engender confidence within the less powerful 
members of the community that the benefits of their cooperation will accrue to them too, 
in an equitable manner. 
     
Numerous local studies suggest investment in small water harvesting structures give 
high rates of return.  In an evaluation of Gujarat Government’s Sardar Patel Participatory 
Water Conservation Program under which 10,708 check dams were constructed in 
Saurashtra and Kutch regions, researchers noted that “within a period of three years, an 
initial investment of Rs.1,58,000 on an average check dam fetched total benefits worth 
Rs 2,51,582.” And that “The investment becomes more attractive if one recognizes that 
the government had to in fact invest only 60 per cent of the average figure of Rs 
1,58,000 under its 60:40 scheme”. Under this scheme, communities invested 40 per cent 
of the funds for the water harvesting structures. The study estimates that in this state, of 
the 4.2 million ha of cultivated land, 2.2 million is rainfed and is critically dependent upon 
supplemental irrigation sustained by small water harvesting and recharge structures.
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What is also clear is that these examples remain scattered because the governance 
system needed to foster people’s control over natural resources does not exist. It is clear 
that ‘upscaling’ the experiences will demand changes in the way we administer our land 
and water resources. The policy must change for practice to change.  
 
Small vs big 
 
It is often argued that small systems are inefficient in harvesting water, as compared to 
large dams and storage reservoirs. Therefore, a strategy which is dependent on 
harvesting water from small catchments in tanks and reservoirs is unreliable and costly.  
 
The problem is that hydrology as a science is the biggest casualty of modern irrigation 
and water management discourse. It is clear that the strategy to harvest water in big and 
small reservoirs is not mutually exclusive. In other words, nations can store rainwater in 
variety of ways; large reservoirs with large catchments by building dams across rivers; in 
smaller reservoirs -- tank and ponds -- with smaller catchments to harvest water, or by 
intercepting rain in ways to percolate water into the ground, increasing recharge and 
sub-surface flows. All options provide ways of augmenting water availability in countries, 
all options are critical.  
 
The problem has been that engineers and water planners are myopic in their thinking 
that ‘big’ is always the answer and have built water management systems singularly 
dependent on this one option. This has also meant that there is little or scattered 
hydrological research on the various options and little actual data collection on the land-
water inter-relationships.  
 
The most instructive lessons in the small-vs-big debate come from research done in 
Israel by scientist Michael Evenari who worked on the Negev desert where the average 
annual rainfall is a mere 105 mm. Evenari was intrigued that the ancient Israeli 
civilisation had built towns right in the middle of the Negev desert with their own 
agriculture and water supply systems. In his effort to reconstruct the ancient farms of the 
Negev, Evenari came up with a very surprising finding: water harvested from small 
watersheds per hectare of watershed area was much more in quantity than that 
collected over large watersheds. This research showed that water collected over larger 
watersheds had higher distribution losses. The loss was stunningly high. While a 1 ha watershed in the Negev yielded as much as 95 cubic metres of water per hectare per 
year, a 345 ha watershed yielded only 24 cum per ha per year. In other words, as much 
as 75 per cent of the water that could be collected was lost. The loss was even higher 
during a drought year. After years of research, Evenari summed his findings as follows: 
“…during drought years with less than 50 mm of rainfall (normal rainfall in the Negev 
desert is about 105 mm) watersheds larger than 50 ha will not produce any appreciable 
water yield while small natural watersheds will yield 20-40 cubic metres per hectare and 




In India, research done by scientists at the government established Central Soil and 
Water Conservation Research and Training Institute in different agro-ecosystems 
confirms that smaller watersheds give higher amounts of water per hectare of catchment 
area. In simple words, this means that in a drought-prone area where water is scarce, 10 
tiny dams with a catchment of 1 ha each will collect much more water than one larger 
dam with a catchment of 10 ha.  Similarly, an intensive and decadal study carried out by 
the US department of agriculture in a semi-arid area of Arizona (355 mm annual rainfall) 
done over two decades found that for every ten-fold increase in the catchment area, the 
average annual runoff went down by about 38 per cent. The authors of the study point 
out that “because of the sparseness of hydrological data in the arid and semi-arid area of 
the world, there is value in the results of any hydrological investigations undertaken in 
arid areas. (This) research is particularly valuable because of the intensity and quality of 
data collection that has continued for over two years. The results obtained in the study 
show how transmission loss can affect the probability of obtaining various amounts of 
annual runoff.” 
 
But nevertheless it would be ridiculous to compare in simple terms the cost effectiveness 
of large systems of water storage with small systems. Large reservoirs of India, for 
instance, have increased storage capacity by over 200 billion cubic meters over the past 
50 years, while all the tanks put together can add 15-20 billion cubic meters only. Small 
reservoirs are dependent on local and highly variable rainfall in their own catchments. 




The point is that small reservoirs maximise the productivity and efficiency of the 
distributed and locally available water resource. Secondly, small reservoirs are not built 
simply to collect water, but also to recharge groundwater in a distributed manner. The 
tanks of south India, for instance, have been critical in storing water so that the individual 
wells are recharged in the command area of the tank. It is this interaction between the 
common-private resource, which was critical for the economy of the water body. Thirdly, 
small reservoirs provide water and food security locally and reduce the inefficiencies in 
first collecting water and then distributing it over long distances. It is for these reasons 
that we need to move beyond the polarised debate on small vs big and move towards 
incorporating the small to make big changes in water for all.  
 
Case studies: using water to build rural economies 
 
Sukhomajri has the distinction of being the first village in India to be levied income tax 
on the income it earns from the ecological regeneration of its degraded watershed. 
Located near the city of Chandigarh, in 1979, when the nation was facing a severe 
drought, the villagers built small tanks to capture the rainwater and agreed to protect 
their watershed in order to ensure that their tanks did not get silted up.
20 The tanks have 
helped to increase crop production by nearly three times and the protection of the forest area has greatly increased grass and tree fodder availability. This, in turn, has increased 
milk production. With growing prosperity, Sukhomajri’s economy has undergone a 
change. “Who could imagine that televisions, tractors and bicycles could be had for mere 
grass and water?” asks a villager.  
 
A combination of public, private and community investments and the participatory efforts 
of the villagers has lead to, according to one cost benefit analysis, a rate of return of the 
order of 19 per cent.
21 One of the most impressive savings resulting from the project is in 
the cost of desilting the Sukhna lake, which supplies water to the downstream city of 
Chandigarh. The inflow of sediment has come down by over 90 per cent. This saves the 
government Rs. 76.5 crore each year in dredging and other costs.
22
 
In Sukhomajri, the main incentive for the villagers to protect their watershed came 
because of the assurance they got from the forest department that they would have the 
right to the usufruct of the degraded forest land. The villagers argued that as they were 
protecting the watershed, they should get the benefits from the increased biomass 
production. The state forest department agreed to give the grass rights to the village 
society as long as the villagers paid the forest department a royalty equivalent to the 
average income earned by the department before the villagers started protecting the 
watershed.  
 
The villagers pay their village society a nominal amount to cut grass in the watershed. A 
part of this is used to pay the forest department and a part is used to generate 
community resources for the village. If the forest department’s assurance, however 
tenuous, was not available, the Sukhomajri experiment would collapse overnight. 
 
Ralegan Siddhi is today held up as a model of development. It is a village situated in a 
drought-prone area of Maharashtra where the annual rainfall ranges from 450 mm to 
650mm only and where the villagers were once not even assured one regular crop.
23
 
In 1975, the village was stricken by poverty. It had hardly one acre of irrigated land per 
family.
24  Krishna Bhaurao Hazare - a retired driver from the Indian army - began work in 
the village by constructing storage ponds, reservoirs and gully plugs. Due to the steady 
percolation of water, the groundwater table began to rise. Simultaneously, government 
social forestry schemes were utilised to plant 300,000-400,000 trees in and around the 
village.
25 Because of the increased availability of irrigation water, land that was lying 
fallow came under cultivation and the total area under farming increased from 630 
hectares to 950 hectares.
26 The average yields of millets, sorghum and onion increased 
substantially.  
 
Every effort was made in the village to ensure equitable access to the resources 
generated. Water is distributed equitably by building a system of community wells. In 
other words, all households have equal access to water from these wells, for drinking 
and irrigation.
1 Furthermore, to build equity in water distribution, only low water-
                                                 
1 It is important to note that water equity concepts differ between the villages of Sukhomajri and Ralegan. In 
Sukhomajri, the effort was to distribute water equitable by breaking the relationship between land and water. 
In other words, every resident was given the right to water, which could be traded by the landless or the 
people with land in the areas not irrigated by the ponds, with others for a share of the crop. This ‘right’ lead 
to cooperation in the village to protect the watershed which in then lead increased grass productivity. Once 
grass availability increased and this was equally shared, this became the driver for cooperation in the 
village. But in Ralegan, the right of water is not shared equitably in all households. Here the right is shared 
equally in all households, which own land and use irrigated water. The increased employment created 
because of increased productivity of the private land has lead to income generation even in the poorer 
households, thus engendering cooperation.   consuming crops were allowed.
27 The treatment of the watershed and the conservation 
of water has lead to increased availability of groundwater in the community wells. Water 
from these wells, supplied at a moderate price, has enabled farmers to grow two to three 




By the late 1990s, not a single inhabitant of the village depended on drought relief. 
Incomes have increased substantially. By Indian standards, Ralegan Siddhi is a rich 
village now. Over a quarter of the households earn over nearly half a million rupees a 
year. This compared against the fact that there are only a million households in India -- 
whom the National Council of Applied Economic research calls the ‘super rich’ -- who 
earn more than a million rupees a year, including estimates of black money. Ralegan 
Siddhi’s income distribution is also much less skewed than that of rural Maharashtra.
29
   
Ralegan Siddhi is, in fact, so rich that it has now even got a branch of a major bank in 
the village itself. The total savings of Ralegan Siddhi villagers alone is reportedly Rs. 3 
crore. For a village that was less than two decades ago, a drunkard’s den with a badly 
degraded environment, this is indeed a miracle.
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An impressive system of decision making has been created in the village. Some 14 
committees operate to ensure people’s participation in all decision making. A 
participatory democratic institution called the Gram Sabha (village assembly) was 
created to take community decisions. According to the Gandhian philosophy on rural 
development, the Gram Sabha, an assembly of all village adults, should act as the most 
important forum for collective decision making in a village just as a nation’s Parliament 
collectively decides on the welfare of a nation.  If villagers are involved in the planning 
and decision making process, they are more open to any changes taking place in the 
village. The purpose of the Gram Sabha is, therefore, to involve every villager in the 
development process and exert social pressure wherever required. In other words, 
Ralegan has given greater importance to participatory democracy rather than 
representative democracy.  
 
Jhabua district in Madhya Pradesh is a case where government has learnt and 
emulated the best practice. Transformation of rural ecosystems with people’s 
participation described above has remained isolated and scattered, led by remarkable 
NGO leaders. Government efforts in afforestation and watershed management have 
never been able to replicate these successes. In most cases, the problem has been that 
the devolution of power to local communities has been half-hearted and inadequate. 
People’s participation has remained largely stuck in the “you participate in my 
programme” syndrome.  
 
In Madhya Pradesh, however, the watershed management programme has become an 
outstanding example in which the government has been able to intervene in a way that 
promotes public participation in environmental management. By the late 1990s, 
researchers found dugwells literally overflowing with water in a place that was described 
as chronically drought-prone. Some 149,283 hectares covering 374 villages in Jhabua 
alone which account for some 22 per cent of the district’s land area have been brought 
under the Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Development Mission (RGWDM).
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The state-wide programme had covered 7,827 villages, and an area of 3.39 million 
hectares by end-March 1998, which is slightly more than one per cent of India’s total 
land area. The total investment in the programme have been of the order of Rs. 300 
crore since it began in 1995-96.
32  
 The watershed programme in Madhya Pradesh has happened because several tiers of 
institutions have been created: firstly, at the state level, for policy coordination; secondly, 
at the district and milli-watershed-level level, for implementation coordination; and, 
finally, at the village level to ensure that all villagers acquire an interest in the effort. For 
example, there were 1,748 women’s groups, with 25,506 participants, were created in 
374 villages of Jhabua.      
 
But most importantly, serious efforts have been made to give local communities powers 
over decision making. And control over resources. For instance, the villagers play an 
active role in managing the funds meant for the watershed programme. Nearly 80 per 
cent of the funds for the programme are put in a bank account managed by the 
Watershed Development Committees made up of village people. The Watershed 
Development Committee tries to bring together all the important interest groups in the 
village and thus replicates the concept of the gram sabha. 
 
Bringing a dead river back to life 
Rainwater harvesting has brought the river Arvari in dry and drought-prone Rajasthan 
back to life.
33 The river flows through a drought stricken region – villagers living on the 
margins of survival are desperately poor and find sustenance by migrating for work to 
cities. According to historical records of the region, the river Arvari, used to provide 
groundwater recharge to wells in the area. But nobody can remember seeing it flow 
except during the short monsoon period. Even the very old remember a dead and dry 
stream. The river – in its 45 km journey to its confluence in the reservoir of a dam on the 
river Sainthal – flows through 70 odd villages. Its source lies in the degraded hills near 
the village of Bhaonta-Koylala.  
 
In 1986, working with a local NGO, the Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) the villagers of 
Bhaonta-Koylala built a rainwater harvesting structure locally known as johad to trap the 
rainwater and to use it to recharge the groundwater. Since then over 200 water 
harvesting structures have been built in the 70 villages in the catchment of Arvari. These 
small dams have helped to recharge the river – literally bringing it to life. Villages talk 
about Arvari’s rebirth as if it was the birth of a child. “Like a child, it too, remained in the 
womb as we started recharging the earth with water“ say villagers. It is an hydological 
miracle” say top geologists in the country. 
 
Arvari’s gradual way to a perennial life is similar to that of a child learning to walk. In 
1990 it flowed till October. In 1991, till January next year. In 1992, till February next year. 
In 1993, till March next year. From 1994 it flowed till April and in 1995 the flow did not 
cease. It has been perennial since. 
 
But with the water came the bureaucracy. In 1996 the villagers of Hamirpura living along 
the Arvari were told that a contractor had been given a licence by the state government 
to start fishing in the river. Under law the river is the property of the government and now 
that it had water, it was ready to take ‘control’ of its resource. But this time villagers were 
not going to keep quiet. They said, this was their river – a river to whom they had given 
birth – and they should be allowed a say in its management. Working with TBS, in 
January 1999 they formed a River Parliament, locally known as the Arvari Sansad – an 
association of all the villages along the river course. The meeting that declared the 
formation of the parliament adopted a constitution to manage the river. If it succeeds this 
“people’s river parliament” will show the way ahead to a number of communities.
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 Harvesting the raindrop for water security 
 
“Four days of rain only. Just four days. And that too after three years of bad drought. But 
we have drinking water in our wells. This is because we have built check-dams to 
harvest our rain. Our neighbours are fleeing the village but we have reserved the well for 
drinking water only”. This is what Surtabhai, a resident of village Mahudi in Gujarat, told 
visiting journalists from the fortnightly magazine, Down To Earth.
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The magazine was doing a follow up story. Something unusual, as journalism is not 
about following stories of specific villages and
36 how they fare year after year. In January 
2000 – the magazine had presented a story of hope. The tale of five villages, which had 
harvested the raindrop to survive, indeed fight drought. It had reported then that these 
villages had water for drinking, even for irrigation, while neighbours had already fled 
looking for distress work. In June 2001, it faithfully followed these villages as the 
subsequent year had brought little rain and more misery. Journalists reported that even 
with another terrible year of drought – the third in a row – all the villages had enough 
water to drink. But irrigation was beginning to be a problem – but only in those villages, 
which had recently begun water harvesting. It was clear that water harvesting is like a 
bank account and that if we keep withdrawing money without investing back, the account 
will be overdrawn – much like our groundwater aquifers. But if we continuously deposit in 
the bank account, the balance will help withstand protracted periods of scarcity. In June 
2002, Down To Earth reporters retraced their steps again to find out how these five 
villages located in the worst drought affected regions of India have coped with one more 
year of below average rainfall.   
 
They found Surtabhai and his family struggling to deal with another year of drought. But 
the little rain that they had harvested by holding it in check dams and recharging the 
groundwater, was giving them relief. This was the story in the other villages as well. In 
the village of Raj Samadhiyala, in Gujarat, villages have voluntarily built check dams and 
village ponds since 1985. Over 45 check dams in an area of over 1000 hectares. There 
has been little or no rain for the past four years. Here there was ample water to drink and 
irrigate crops. Now the village plans to use remote sensing technologies to locate 
subsurface dykes to store rainwater.  
 
Overall it was clear that even after four years of poor rainfall and certainly after three 
years of consecutive backbreaking drought, rainwater harvesting had helped villages 
withstand the worst. Sceptics have maintained that rainfall is too variable and so 
rainwater harvesting is not viable. But these stories revealed that it works. It is possible 
to build livelihoods, indeed economic well being by investing in capturing the rainwater 
endowment of the area.  
 
6. Upscaling the ‘difference’ 
 
The experience of villages like Sukhomajri, Ralegan Siddhi and villages in Alwar district 
and the several others scattered across the country shows that community based 
rainwater harvesting can, in fact, become the starting point to eradicate rural poverty 
itself. Increased and assured water availability means increased and stable agricultural 
production and improved animal care. Rainwater harvesting has helped Ralegan Siddhi 
in Maharashtra transform itself from one of the most destitute villages of the country in 
the 1970s to one of the richest villages today.  
 But it is important for policy to learn that ecological restoration is not primarily about 
planting trees or rehabilitating landscapes. It is about deepening democracy. In 
Sukhomajri, Ralegan Siddhi, Alwar, and Jhabua, natural assets began to accumulate 
only after communities were mobilised and won greater power to manage their 
environment. In each case, a non-governmental organization or the state played a 
catalytic role by providing the community funds to invest and helping to find ways around 
restrictive laws. Water harvesting then is more about water rights, than about building 
infrastructure.  
 
Such cases remain few and scattered in India, in large part because the country’s legal 
framework denies villager’s property rights over common lands and water. Under the 
Indian water acts, the state has the sole right to capture, harvest and divert water. In 
three of the cases described above, the villages strictly speaking are managing the 
common property ‘illegally’: they have appropriated control, and after considerable 
tension and conflict they have reached an unwritten understanding with the government 
authorities. For instance, the state irrigation department sent a notice against the very 
first johad (water harvesting structure) built by NGO Tarun Bharat Sangh in the village of 
Gopalpura. They declared the structure “illegal” under the existing water laws. Under the 
Rajasthan Drainage Act of 1956, “water resources standing and collected either on 
private or public land (including groundwater) belong to the Government of Rajasthan.” 
The villagers were asked by the government agency to “remove” these structures as all 
drains and small streams are government property. The irrigation agency first argued 
that a downstream dam would get reduced water because of these village structures. 
Later it changed its stand to say that these unauthorised structures could get washed 
away and flood local villages. Finally, the sheer persistence of the people succeeded in 
saving the structure. Even in Madhya Pradesh, where the state government itself 
initiated change, the laws on the books remain unchanged.  
 
As these initiatives have progressed, new demands for institutional innovation have 
arisen. In Alwar and Madhya Pradesh, for example, watershed protection has made 
more groundwater available, but this has spurred the sinking of tubewells that threaten 
to deplete the aquifer and raise the danger of inequities in distribution between those 
who have pumps and those who do not. In Alwar the villagers have set up a river 
parliament to contend with these issues, and in Madhya Pradesh the government is 
considering giving village watershed committees the power to set rules over 
groundwater usage.  
 
In all these cases, progress has been possible because the communities created local 
assemblies that deliberate in the open and invite widespread participation.  
 
The answer again lies in fostering democracy. The above case studies show that open 
and participatory village institutions, with clearly defined property rights, are in the best 
position to balance competing interests in the community. This does not mean that 
conflict will disappear, or that all decisions will serve the interests of the poor. But 
participatory democracy does provide an institutional and legal framework that allows the 
poor to fight for their rights and defend the natural resources on which their livelihoods 
depend. 
 
It is also clear that water harvesting is not about water alone. It is about the relationship 
of water with land and forests. This, unfortunately, is where policy goes horrendously 
wrong. Land is managed by a multitude of bureaucracies, water by another. This 
ensures that villagers are disenfranchised from the management of their resources (see 
box; Laporiya: linking water to milk). Community based water management will demand 
that policies are built around the resources of the villages, not around the bureaucracies that manage the resources that the village uses. Ultimately, the water policy will have to 
become the developmental policy for the country.   
 
Box: Laporiya: linking water to milk
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After five successive years of debilitating drought the village dairy in Laporiya — a one 
room shop with an electronic machine to detect fat content in the milk — was lined with 
people bringing their product for sale. Even in this crippling drought year of 2004 they 
had sold Rs 34 lakh worth of milk last year.  How could this be? The map displayed in 
the village centre explained the transformation. The green painted area was the village 
common land — grazing land vested with the government. This, explained villagers, was 
the land they had to fight to regain control over, as it was encroached and degraded. On 
the map, squares had been painted. These denoted chaukas — a unique water 
harvesting system designed to retain every drop of rainwater and to recharge the 
aquifer. All over the common land, villagers had dug rectangular trenches less than 1 
feet deep, so that rainwater would ‘jump’ across the land till it flowed into the village 
tanks.  
 
With this system in place, the village common land became a grand water collection 
area. Every drop was channelled and stored in the village’s three connected tanks — 
deepened by voluntary labour. Of the 1000-odd ha of agricultural land, roughly 600 ha 
was irrigated. For the past few years the tanks had barely filled; today, they were bone 
dry. Still, the wells have water. Laporiya practices the conjunctive use of irrigation 
structures — surface and ground.   
 
But what was clear is that it was the years of water harvesting (over 10 years in this 
case) that had built up groundwater reserves. Built it up so well that even repeated years 
of drought and scarcity could be withstood. Rainwater harvesting is like putting hard-
earned money in a bank account: prudently and repeatedly replenish the aquifer, then 
live off the interest and not mine the capital of the groundwater reserves. But this takes 
time. It takes people who care about their land, so that they care to harvest their water.  
 
For Laporiya and many other neighbouring villages, the most difficult struggle has been 
not to combat drought, but to regain control over the village common lands. These are 
some of the most abused lands in the country. Grazing lands — village commons — 
technically fall under the control of the panchayats (local elected bodies), but they vest it 
with the state bureaucracies. In this desert state of Rajasthan, livestock-based practices 
form the base of the rural economy — for milk, meat and wool. This is the economic 
wealth of the state.  
 
The fact is that India desperately needs a policy for common lands — forest or grazing 
lands — so that these are seen as the base to rebuild rural economies. These are the 
catchments for water, for food and for milk. Without the commons, little private wealth 
gets created. Laporiya knows that in the drought-prone region it belongs to, animal-
based economies are far more durable than agriculture. It uses its water to irrigate its 
grazing lands first, so that even after sustained drought there is some fodder for animals 
to eat. The precious water in the wells is used to grow animal feed, so that there will be 
milk and wool to provide sustenance to people. This is a lesson worth emulating.  
 
Principles of ‘upscaling’ 
It is important to realise that successful examples of resource management and poverty 
eradication remain scattered because the governance system needed to foster people’s 
control over natural resources does not exist in large parts of the South. Therefore, the institutional framework for governance will have to be restructured keeping in mind the 
following principles:   
 
1. Planning for village resources must be done at the settlement level: Local 
resource management demands integrated thinking. People living in villages know that 
their ‘village ecosystem’ consists of several integrated components: croplands, grazing 
lands, forest and tree lands, local water bodies, livestock and various energy sources. 
They know the interactions between these different systems are integral to its productive 
use. But bureaucracies do not understand integration. Current rural development efforts 
in most parts of the South are extremely fragmented – if they focus on agriculture, they 
discount livestock rearing, if they focus on ponds to hold water, they discount the 
catchment area which feeds the pond. Land is managed by a one set of bureaucracies, 
water by another. The integration of these resources and agencies is best done through 
the strengthening of village-local institutions so that resource planning can be done at 
the level of the settlement.  
  
2. Community participation in the programme must be secured: All new plantations 
and grasslands have to be protected. But since all common lands have intense users, 
any attempt to enclose a patch of degraded land will be strongly resented by the people, 
however under-productive it may be to begin with.  If people’s support does not exist, the 
survival rates of village assets like check dams, tanks will be extremely poor. It is 
important to note that ecologically resources like trees, grasses, ponds and tanks are 
fragile assets and cannot be created and maintained by any bureaucracy. It is for this 
reason that the programme for water management must secure the full participation of 
people; it must be planned by them and they must be in charge of its implementation 
and management.  
 
3. Village institutions must be strengthened. Rational use and maintenance of village 
land and water resources needs discipline. Villagers have to ensure that animals do not 
graze in their protected commons, the catchments of their local water bodies are 
conserved and properly used, and the common produce from these lands is equitably 
distributed within the village. Villagers can do all this, and more, only if there is an 
effective village-level institution to energise and involve them in controlling and 
managing their environment.  Deepening democracy at the grassroots is a critical 
determinant for ecological regeneration and local water management.  
 
The nature of the village institution is also critical in ensuring equity and cooperation in 
the village. As the natural resource base grows, so do the interests of the rich and the 
powerful in augmenting their share. Strengthening property rights and village institutions 
to withstand this threat becomes all the more critical. It has long been held that village 
institutions fail to protect the poor against powerful vested interests, and that the best 
solution is to strengthen outside agencies. Over more than five decades of India’s 
independence, however, bureaucracies too have become handmaidens of the rich and 
powerful. Their closed nature and lack of accountability engender corruption, leading to 
more inequality, not less. It is for this reason that open and participatory institutions at 
the grassroots will provide local leadership and spaces for arbitration over village level 
disputes.   
.  
 
4. The legal framework must enable people to manage their local resources: Laws 
dealing with natural resources like land, water and forests will have to be changed to 
give people the right to improve and develop the village natural resource base.  
Currently, in India, the government owns a substantial portion of land and water 
resources.  Natural resources are thus largely government property and not community property. The result is that village communities have lost all interest in their management 
or protection.  This alienation has led to massive denudation of forests, overexploitation 
of grazing lands and neglect of local water systems. This will only change if the people 
get a stake in the improvement of the natural resource base by reforming the current 
legal structure of control over natural resources. 
 
5. Funds for water management must be directed to the village institution: In most 
countries, various functionaries and agencies of the government control finances for 
village development. Ultimately, only a small proportion reaches the community and is 
spent on projects over which it has no control and for which it has not set any priority. 
One option is to channelise funds directly to village institutions.  
 
7. The water futures: when government learns change 
 
The need to learn from traditional wisdom to build the modern water policy has began to 
take root in the country. In 2002, while releasing the national water policy, the Indian 
prime minister said, “exclusive control by the government machinery and the resultant 
mindset that water management is the exclusive responsibility of government cannot 
help us make the paradigm shift to participative, essentially local management of water 
resources.” He went on, “let this meeting send out a powerful message that harnessing 
every drop of rainwater is a national priority and that every village should earmark five 
per cent of its area for community water bodies.” “This is a powerful idea whose time has 
come” concluded the prime minister. 
 
This message is driving programme changes in the country. In the 2004-05 national 
budget the government launched a massive scheme to repair, renovate and restore all 
the water bodies that are linked to agriculture. “The effort has to be to put into place an 
effective and sustained implementation of this programme so we can provide water 
security and hence livelihood security to our farmers” said the finance minister. This 
scheme is now being implemented and key to its success will be the ability of the 
government to learn from the micro-experiences so involve communities in the 
management of the resource.    
 
In 2005, the Indian government also brought in a path-setting legislation to guarantee 
employment to people during times of drought and stress. The National Employment 
Guarantee Act will be initially targeted at 200 most backward districts of the country and 
gives “minimum 100 days of guaranteed waged employment to one person in all rural 
households”. The aim is to avert famine and hunger by providing jobs and so securing 
people’s livelihoods during times of extreme distress. The Act also provides for one-third 
reservation for women and a minimum wage guarantee.  
 
This programme will involve creating a massive public works initiative. The government 
in its announcement for the programme has listed the works for employment, which 
includes at the very top employment generation through watershed development, 
renovation of water bodies, desilting of tanks and afforestation. Decentralised water 
harvesting is very much on the agenda of this crucial jobs-for-livelihood security 
programme.    
 
The challenge is to ensure that the jobs programme will invest in building durable natural 
assets – ponds, tanks, community wells, other traditional water harvesting structures – 
which will provide not drought relief but relief against drought (see box: jobs for water). It 
is now imperative, for this programme to succeed, that communities across the country 
are engaged, in what can be known, as the biggest cooperative exercise in the world. This will require much greater innovation that we have seen in governments working with 
people to build diverse and decentralised water structures.  
 
 
8. Jobs and water 
 
India in 2005 has enacted a national legislation, which guarantees jobs to people living 
in the poorest, most marginalised regions of the country. Under the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act the government has legislated to guarantee 100 days of 
employment to any rural household, whose adult members ask for work. The scheme, 
which will provide a security net to the poorest in times of scarcity and famine, is also an 
opportunity to create durable assets for rural regeneration. The scheme has come into 
effect in 200 of the country’s poorest districts and will cost the government Rs 13,000 
crore in 2006-07 in job creation.  
 
The Act authorises the gram sabha (village assembly) to recommend the work to be 
taken up by the rural employment guarantee programme. The local representative body, 
the village panchayat, has been charged with implementation of 50 per cent of the 
programmes under this scheme. In other words, this scheme will involve villager in 
planning and executing programmes for village-level works.   
 
This bill could actually change the economic futures of millions of Indians. But to do this, 
the government will have to focus, not on the quantum of money, but on what it is spent 
and how it is spent. The votaries of the employment guarantee bill see it primarily as 
welfare: doling out work to the poor in return for which they get money and can buy food 
to tide over another drought. But this bill can be the answer to drought and economic 
destitution: it can provide not just drought relief, but relief against drought.  
 
This is an opportunity to make jobs work for development. The list of “permissible works 
under the scheme are clearly related to the creation and maintaining of rural assets: 
water conservation, de-silting tanks, planting trees, protection grazing lands and other 
rural infrastructure (see box: What works for employment?). 
 
The key challenge is to ensure that the assets, which are created through this massive 
employment programme, last beyond the immediate famine. It is critical that its 
implementation ensures that the labour invested in rural regeneration leads to durable 
and productive assets? That is the challenge of the new generation of employment 
programme. 
 
The programme, if not designed for long-term development, will lead to unproductive 
employment generation: digging holes to fill them with earth and then digging them 
again. The road constructed one year, using the labour of the poor, will be washed away 
the next season. The check-dam built one year will be gone by the next. The sapling, 
planted one year, will wither away the next. It is precisely this hole that must be plugged. 
But for this, the employment programme has to become the basis of village level 
developmental activity. The labour of the poor should be used to build their natural 
capital.  
 
It is here that the country must learn from similar work schemes in the country. The 
largest and oldest is the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) of the state of 
Maharashtra. This programme began in the early 1970s, when the state was facing a 
crippling drought. It began with public works, designed to give people money for their 
labour in times of drought. But in the late 1980s, it was understood that the investment would be much more meaningful if it lead to the creation of community assets and 
protection of the environment. Over the past 30 years, the programme has invested in 
over 50,000 minor irrigation programmes in the districts. It is clear, however, that this 
investment, if not integrated in the developmental schemes of the village and if not 
executed through villagers remains unsustainable. The programme provides immediate 
relief so that each drought does not turn into a mass famine, but it does not lead to 
regeneration of the village economy.  
 
A recent study by the Centre for Science and Environment in the EGS villages found that 
there has been substantial investment in water conservation in the drought affected 
districts. But that this investment has been more effective for private asset creation than 
public and common assets. A considerable amount of work has been done on building 
check-dams, percolation dams, bunding fields and digging trenches to improve recharge 
has mostly happened on private land of farmers. This has definitely improved the 
productivity of these lands as well as water availability. But the problem is that without 
work on community and government owned forest lands the work on water conservation 
remains ineffective. The problem is that institutional structures of EGS have not been 
capable of working with local communities to protect community resources.  
 
The is why it is important in the next phase of the employment guarantee programme, 
which is being up-scaled at the national level to learn that asset building is not merely 
about jobs. Assets require clarity of ownership and stake in management. Currently, the 
programme is designed to create employment for building public (actually governmental) 
assets: roads, schools and ponds. The problem is that these governmental assets are 
nobody’s assets. Moreover, government agencies at the village level are fractured and 
so, implementation of their programmes gets distorted as well. 
 
Take water structures. A pond requires a catchment. But even as the employment 
programme uses labour to dig the pond, its catchment is controlled by government 
departments: say, the forest department or the revenue department. The pond probably 
belongs to the panchayat (if it is small) or the irrigation department (if it is large). 
Anyhow, the pond remains, what it is not meant to be, a hole in the ground: it has no 
water and can’t recharge groundwater — a typical example of unproductive employment. 
 
The question to ask is who can best create these durable assets? Fractured 
bureaucracies will provide fractured answers. The answer is to find the owners of the 
asset and provide them legal rights to manage these resources. To do this we will need 
to integrate employment generation with decentralisation and put jobs into the domain of 
the panchayats.  
 
The national employment guarantee programme has incorporated this learning from 
earlier experiences. In the current programmes, villagers are required to plan and the 
local elected bodies will implement the projects. The issue now is to ensure that these 
village institutions have the capacity to plan and implement the schemes.  
 
The village institutions will also need to coordinate between the different resource –
owning agencies of the government. This employment programme will need different 
land and water bureaucracies of the state to function as line agencies of the panchayat 
so that the assets created are planned, owned and operated by communities, not 
faceless agencies. With innovation in systems of governance — strengthening the 
accountability of panchayats (representative and elected local bodies) through gram 
sabhas (village assemblies), putting the transfer of money in public domain — the 
money can actually reach those it’s meant for. And then, be made to work. This is the opportunity to use employment for ecological regeneration so that the labour of the poor, 
can build the resources to secure the present and the future.  
 
Box: What works for employment? 
List of “permissible” work under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act  
1.  Water conservation and water harvesting 
2.  Drought proofing, including afforestation and tree planting 
3.  Irrigation canals, including micro and minor irrigation works 
4.  Renovation of traditional water bodies, including de-silting of tanks 
5.  Land development  
6.  Flood control and protection work, including drainage in waterlogged areas 
7.  Rural connectivity to provide all-weather access (rural roads) 
 
 
9. The urban challenge: drinking water and sewage question 
             
India is growing rapidly in its cities. By 2001, as much as 28 per cent of the country’s 
population lived in urban settlements – in the last decade the rate of growth was a 
staggering 30 per cent. Cities require basic services – water and sanitation and while 
government estimates that as much as 80 per cent of urban Indians have access to safe 
drinking water and 64 per cent to sanitation facilities, it is clear these numbers hide more 
than they tell. Shortages of drinking water cripple cities. The quality of water supplied is 
increasingly a problem. The fact is that pollution of the rivers and other water systems 
puts pressure on the public water utilities to increase treatment costs. Groundwater 
levels are declining precipitously in urban areas as people bore deeper in search of the 
water that municipalities cannot supply. In all this, the waste generated by cities is not 
treated and adds to the burden of contamination of water bodies.  
 
Finding water for cities and treating waste 
The current paradigm requires cities to source water from further and further away. This 
then increases the cost of treatment and delivery of water. It also leads to inefficiencies 
in supply, with distribution losses are estimated to be in the order of 30-50 per cent in 
almost all cities of the country. This then results in developments, which further cripple 
water supply in cities. Firstly, as the cost of supply and delivery is high, the state can 
afford to supply water to some and not all in cities. This leads to huge problems in 
inequity within cities (see case study: Delhi’s water and excreta tales). Secondly, the 
political imperative results in cities not charging its users for water supply. This, in turn 
leads to increased wastage and inefficiency. The burden on public utilities grows. But it 
is important to understand that even if public agencies were to do full cost pricing – 
charge users the cost of water supply and waste disposal – most cities would not be 
able to pay for the costs. This is because the current capital intensive technological 
model adopted by cities of the South requires huge investment in supply and treatment 
of water and waste. But the answers and alternative paradigms for urban cities are more 
difficult to find.   
 
In this situation, what needs to be done? Firstly, each city will have to plug its losses. But 
the answer is not simply to “privatise” water supply as most cities have found that the 
answers that this provides are limited.  
 
The answer will lie in finding cost effective solutions to supply and disposal. This can 
only be done if the water utilities are improved, services are paid for and, most 
importantly, we realise that distribution losses can best be plugged by reducing the 
length of the pipeline itself. A city will be much more efficient if it can strategise to locally collect water, supply it locally and take back the waste locally. This can be done. The city 
must look at its groundwater reserves carefully and create strategies to augment these 
reserves. It must only draw water it requires from external sources after it has optimised 
its own.  
 
The water imperative is that cities must begin to value their rainfall endowment. This 
means implementing rainwater harvesting in each house and colony. But it also means 
re-learning about the hundreds of tanks and ponds that built, indeed nourished the city in 
the past. Almost every city in the country had a treasure of tanks, which provided it the 
important flood cushion and allowed it to recharge its groundwater reserves. But urban 
planners over the years have allowed these water bodies to be decimated. Cities only 
see land for building, not land for water.  
 
Today, these water bodies are a shame – encroached, full of sewage, garbage or just 
filled up and built over. Bangalore, at the beginning of the 1960s had 262 lakes, now 
only 10 hold water. The Ahmedabad collector – on directions from the high court – listed 
137 lakes in the city but also said that over 65 had been built over already. In Delhi, 508 
waterbodies were identified – again on court orders – but are not protected.  
 
This will require re-learning the art of water management in the profession that builds 
houses and plans cities. Currently, the profession of builders and architects have simply 
never been taught how to hold water. They have been trained to see water as waste and 
to build systems to dispose it as fast as possible. For instance, cities in Germany are 
beginning to do this. To save investing in stormwater drains, they provide incentives to 
households to harvest and recharge rainwater. The city charges a tax based on the 
calculation of the paved area and the water-runoff coefficient. If rainwater harvesting is 
done and the load on the city’s stormwater drainage is reduced, the burden of tax on the 
house-owner is reduced accordingly.  
 
But this even this will not be enough. The city will have to learn to minimise its water use 
and work on conservation and reuse. It needs to plan carefully and reduce the water 
need in homes and factories. Rich Austrialia, which also is water-stressed, has passed a 
bill that mandates household equipment be water-efficient. But in India, flush toilets still 
use more water than anywhere else in the world. 
 
Indian cities must look at their waste economy and invest in reuse. This will require them 
to invest in state of the art equipment that completely cleans wastewater up, making it 
potable again. For instance, Singapore uses expensive membrane technology to do this. 
The other alternative is that cities of the South leapfrog so that they minimise on 
generation of waste or ensure the waste is segregated — household waste from 
industrial waste — so that what is relatively less toxic can be cleaned up and then used 
to recharge groundwater or irrigate fields. For instance, the desert city of Jaipur can treat 
its wastewater and use it to recharge its groundwater. It could channelise the treated 
water to its waterbodies, so developed as to make the soil act as a cleanser. Israel does 
this.  
 
But all this require a major change in mindset so that rich cities of the poor South find 
innovative answers in their water and excreta management. It is also a fact that modern 
technologies for cleaning waste are out of reach from the waste-accumulated societies 
of the poor South. They are too expensive to install and even more expensive to run.  
 
The problem is that even as modern industry has universalised the use of its chemicals 
and other pollutants, it has not worked hard to universalise the answers needed to 
mitigate its deadly discharge. The reason is that industry has treated waste as a business – it must be profitable to treat. This principle works when society has money to 
pollute and also to treat. But in large parts of this poor and polluted South, there is little 
money to treat on its human excreta, let alone its modern chemical waste.  
 
It is here the challenge lies: To reinvent the paradigm of waste treatment by reinventing 
the paradigm of waste generation itself.   
 
Case study: Delhi’s water and excreta tale 
Delhi, the capital city of India is a water guzzler. The cities water demand is estimated at 
3,600 million lites of water per day. The public utility, the Delhi Jal Board supplies 3040 
million litres per day. But only about 1,730 million litres reaches consumers because of 
distribution losses.  
 
The problem is compounded by the fact that only certain parts of the city receive 
adequate supply of water. The political economy of water in Delhi is also a story of 
power and inequity:   
•  Three per cent of the population receives more than 450 lpcd: areas under the 
New Delhi Municipal Corporation get 462 lpcd; Delhi Cantonment receives 509 lpcd. 
Thus, this three per cent receives 11 per cent of the water the Delhi Jal Board (DJB) 
supplies.  
•  70 per cent of the population living in villages in the National capital territory 
consume less than 5 per cent of total water supplied. 
 
The city planners find that water shortages require them to search for new sources of 
water. It is already fighting for its share of Ganga water from the neighbouring states of 
Uttar Pradesh. In 2005, the conflict over its water reached flashpoint with its neighbour, 
Uttar Pradesh refusing to release water for Delhi’s water treatment plant. The prime 
minister intervenes in the matter but even he was rebuffed by political leaders of the 
upper riparian state, who say their farmers and cities need water first. Delhi is already 
water-spoilt, they told the Prime Minister. The city also proposes to build more storage 
facilities in the upper reaches of the Himalayas for its future supply. 
 
The cost of water supplied is also not recovered. It is estimated it costs the government 
Rs 8-9 to supply 1,000 litres of water; for this, it charges roughly Rs 2. Nobody knows 
what collection and disposal of sewage costs, but it is estimated it is normally five times 
higher than water distribution costs.  
 
The city government does not have the political will to increase tariffs to charge full cost 
pricing. But recently, it had proposed a scheme to privatise parts of the city’s water 
distribution so that it could supposedly lead to greater efficiency in supply and recovery 
of costs. But the scheme, proposed in consultation with the World Bank called the 24x7 
water supply reform continued with the two travesties of city water pricing. The 
government would remain in charge of water tariffs, which it promises not to raise even if 
households use much more water. Also, the scheme does not include the collection of 
sewage. In other words, more water will be supplied, which will not be paid for. More 
sewage will be generated, which will not be paid for. This would mean that the public 
water utility that is inefficient also because it does not get paid would become even more 
burdened. 
 
The city disposes its excreta in the river Yamuna, which flows through it. This important 
river of the country is virtually “dead” during its journey through the city, as the city 
withdraws water upstream and discharges only sewage. The river does not have any 
assimilative capacity to dilute the waste.   
But this is not to say that Delhi does not have sewage treatment facilities. In fact, it has 
constructed 17 sewage treatment plants, with installed capacity to treat anywhere 
between 60-90 per cent of the waste generated. The fact is that the quantum of waste a 
city generates is in direct proportion to the water it consumes: at a minimum, 80 per cent 
of water supplied to a household leaves as waste. But as large parts of the city are 
dependent on groundwater, city planners do not know how much water the city uses and 
therefore, how much water it discharges.  
 
But even as the sewage treatment plants are built, they are not utilised fully. The reason 
is that large parts of the city remain unconnected to the official sewerage system. Large 
parts of the city, an estimated 50 per cent live in slums and unauthorised colonies, 
where government services do not reach. In this circumstance, even as part of the 
sewage is collected, transported and even treated, large parts of sewage is uncollected 
and untreated. The untreated and the treated effluent get mixed in the drain, before 
discharge into the river, which then nullifies the treatment provided.  
 
It is in this scenario, that Delhi has to rethink its water future. The answers will lie in 
reducing costs of distribution and so that losses in distribution. This will mean that the 
city will have to recharge its groundwater – through its tanks and home based rainwater 
harvesting systems – so that it can depend on this source sustainably. This will also 
reduce its operation costs, which can be invested in greater efficiency. The city will have 
to ensure water for all, not just the rich in the city. And, most importantly, innovate in 
sewage treatment systems so that it can reduce costs and recycle its waste.  
 
    
Note: 1 lakh is 100,000 and 1 crore is 10 million. Exchange rates have increased 
steadily from 1970s and early 1980 when they stood at Rs 10 equals to 1 dollar to 2005 
when the exchange is Rs 46 equals to 1 dollar.   
Annexure 1: Traditional Wisdom 
 
Each region of India had its own technology to harvest rain. To live with its water 
endowment 
 
Hill areas: diverting streams  
Traditionally, wherever there were streams, especially in the hill and mountain regions of 
India, people diverted the water with the help of simple engineering structures, into 
artificial channels that would take the water to agricultural fields. The most 
technologically sophisticated system can be traced to the northeastern India where 
people built bamboo pipelines to carry water from natural springs over long distances, 
using an intricate network of pipelines spread over difficult terrains. The entire system 
worked like a modern drip irrigation network that delivers measured quantities of water 
straight to the roots of the plants. Some 18-20 litres of water enters the bamboo irrigation 
systems every minute and after getting transported over several hundred metres, is 
reduced to 20-80 drops per minute at the site of the plant.
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Dry India: Harvesting the rain and capturing runoff 
In several parts of India, people have been building dams across seasonal channels to 
capture the runoff. But these structures, unlike normal dams, are used to moisten the 
soil so that the post-monsoon crop would be assured of the rich soil of the tank bed 
itself. In dry areas of Rajasthan, people have traditionally practised conjunctive use of 
surface water and groundwater (see box: Jodhpur: providing an example). They invariably 
built structures like wells and stepwells — wells with a flight of stairs leading down to the 
water — below tanks and other types of water storage structures. Thus, when the tank water 
dried up, people could at least harvest clean groundwater to meet their drinking water needs. 
Rajasthan also has an old tradition of using rooftops as a catchment area to collect 
rainwater.  
 
In areas where land is not a limiting factor, people developed customised rainwater 
harvesting structures called kundis. These are artificial wells which store runoff from an 
artificially prepared catchment surrounding them so that rainwater that falls on the 
catchment rapidly runs into the well and gets stored. Their potential can be understood 
by the following fact: If an area receives only 100 mm of rainfall — which would make it 
an extremely arid environment — this rain harvested over one ha of land would provide 
one million litres of water a year. As a family of five would not need more than 10-15 
litres a day for drinking and cooking — 180-270 families could meet their most critical 
water needs by building a one-ha kundi in the driest regions of the world..  
South India: building a culture of tanks 
Not all storage structures are riverfed or streamfed. Many stuctures collect water running off a 
catchment area to be stored for later use. In the southern state of Tamil Nadu, a big stream is 
often diverted to feed a chain of 25-30 tanks in sequence. As this chain of tanks — called 
‘system tanks’ — is served by a stream collecting water over a large catchment, it is 
traditionally considered much more desirable than a tank with a single, small catchment. The 
Palar anicut (dam) system, for example, supplies water to 317 tanks, irrigating about 32,000 
ha in North Arcot and Chengalpattu districts. The profusion of tanks in Ramnathapuram 
district of the state can even be seen from a satellite. 
 
The legacy of Bill Willcocks 
Bengal’s history provides an eye-opener for irrigation managers.  
In India’s flood plains, the people developed ingenious techniques to use the menacing 
floodwaters, not just to irrigate their fields but also to fertilise them and control diseases 
like malaria (by making use of fish in the floodwaters to eat away mosquito larvae, for 
instance). 
 
With agricultural production declining rapidly in once prosperous Bengal, the Colonial  
government invited William Willcocks, a British irrigation expert, to advise it on irrigation 
development in Bengal. In a series of lectures delivered in Calcutta in the 1920s, 
Willcocks stunned everyone by arguing that the absolute best that the government could 
do was to revive the ancient flood irrigation system of the region.
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When Willcocks tried to plan a system of irrigation canals for the Bengal countryside, he 
was astonished to find that every ‘dead river’ on the map sheltered an appropriate place 
for a canal. To his discerning eye, the parallel alignments of the main canals, maintained 
over long distances, contrasted sharply to what he called “the tangled meaningless mass 
of waterways... where we have nature’s undirected handiwork.” He concluded that 
during floods, the embankments along these canals would be regularly breached to take 
the floodwaters to the fields. But the British administrators had misunderstood them for 
flood embankments and considered the regular breaches in them as discreditable efforts 
of the local people. Therefore, the government did not do anything to desilt these canals 
and maintain them. Even worse, wherever possible, they constructed solid 
embankments to prevent wholesale breaches. 
  
The resulting destruction of the overflow irrigation system of Bengal steadily led to a 
decline in agricultural production, increase in malaria and the famous famines. The 




Jodhpur: providing an example 
 
The most outstanding example of conjunctive use of water (prevalent in Rajasthan’s arid 
regions) is in the city of Jodhpur, once a fabulously rich desert fort. The Jodhpur fort is 
situated at the edge of a rocky plateau. The former kings had built a series of canals to 
collect the runoff from the plateau and channel it into several tanks built in and around 
the fort. For houses that came up on the incline down the plateau, numerous stepwells 
and wells were constructed to capture seepage from the reservoirs above. In its 500-
year old history, Jodhpur has witnessed many droughts, but never a desperation for 
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